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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard W. Kriebel appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Kriebel filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 29, 
2007, collaterally attacking his conviction for lewd conduct with a child.1 (R., p. 
3.) In the petition he alleged that his attorney had been deficient for failing to 
move to suppress his court-ordered psychosexual sentencing evaluation. (R., 
pp. 4-5.) The district court thereafter appointed counsel to represent Kriebel. 
(R., p. 21.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp. 22-23.) 
The bases for the motion were that the petition was untimely and that the 
allegations therein were conclusory and unsupported by evidence. (R., pp. 24-
29.) On Kriebel's request, the district court agreed to first address the issue of 
timeliness and reserve the issue of whether the petition was subject to dismissal 
on the merits for another time. (Tr., p. 7, L. 21 - p. 8, L. 9.) 
Kriebel thereafter filed an affidavit in which he stated that he had been 
incarcerated in Washington from some time in September 2005 until some time 
in December 2005; that his criminal defense counsel advised him that he did not 
have "good prospects" for a post-conviction case and failed to advise him about 
1 Kriebel signed the petition on November 23, 2007 and mailed it on November 
26, 2007. (R., pp. 6-7.) 
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"time-frames and the legal grounds to bring such cases"; that his criminal counsel 
had not advised him of the right to remain silent during pre-sentencing testing; 
and that the judge made comments based on the pre-sentence report. (R., pp. 
36-37.) Also filed was the correspondence from trial counsel referenced in the 
affidavit. (Augmentation.) Kriebel's post-conviction counsel filed a brief in which 
he argued that the limitation period should be tolled while Kriebel was without 
access to Idaho courts and that Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 
(2006), the case on which Kriebel relied, should be given retroactive effect. (R., 
pp. 38-42.) 
The state's motion proceeded to hearing on the timeliness of the petition. 
(R., p. 43; Tr., p. 10, L. 5 - p. 13, L. 22.) The district court granted the motion 
and summarily dismissed. (R., pp. 44-60.) The district court found that Kriebel 
had been sentenced on September 1, 2005, and did not appeal his sentence; the 
one-year deadline for filing the petition was therefore October 13, 2006; and the 
instant petition had been filed on November 29, 2007. (R., p. 48.) The district 
court rejected the claim that the limitation period had been tolled due to lack of 
access to the courts, concluding that Kriebel's brief out-of-state incarceration 
would not have made a difference even if the limitation period tolled during that 
time, and that the letter he received from his criminal trial counsel did not deprive 
him of access to Idaho courts. (R., pp. 48-51.) The district court also concluded 
that Estrada should not be given retroactive application. (R., pp. 51-60.) 
Kriebel filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 64-67.) 
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ISSUES 
Kriebel states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Did the district court err when it granted the State's motion 
for summary dismissal because it erroneously decided that Estrada 
should not be retroactively applied to Mr. Kriebel? 
2) Should the statute of limitations to file a post-conviction 
petition be tolled in Mr. Kriebel's case because he was denied due 
process of law as a result of the new rule announced in Estrada, his 
limited access to Idaho resources, and his trial attorney's 
discouraging advice on filing a petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Kriebel failed to show error in the district court's ruling that retroactive 
application of Estrada is not required because it pronounces neither a new rule 
nor a "watershed" rule? 
2. Has Kriebel failed to show error in the trial court's determination that he 
did not establish that he was denied access to the Idaho Courts such that his 
petition could be deemed timely? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Kriebel's Petition Was Not Filed Within The One-Year Time Limit Mandated By 
The UPCPA 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Kriebel's untimely petition for post-conviction 
relief. (R., pp. 44-60.) Kriebel argues that he should be excused from the 
UPCPA's one-year limitation period for filing a petition because the holding of 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given 
retroactive application. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Kriebel's argument is 
without merit for three reasons. First, because Kriebel filed his petition more than 
one year after Estrada was decided his petition is untimely under any legal 
standard. Second, there is no "retroactivity" exception to the one-year filing 
deadline of I.C. § 19-4902(a). Third, even if there were such an exception, the 
holding of Estrada does not meet the applicable test for retroactive application. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The application of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of 
facts is a question of law subject to free review on appeal. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,968 (2001); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,206,984 P.2d 
128, 129 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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C. Even If Estrada Were To Be Given Retroactive Effect Kriebel's Petition Is 
Untimely 
Even if there were a "retroactivity" exception, it would not apply to 
Kriebel's petition. The Supreme Court of Idaho decided Estrada on November 
24, 2006. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Kriebel filed 
his petition more than a year later, on November 29, 2007. (R., p. 3.) Even if 
Kriebel were entitled to the benefit of the "mailbox rule," he sent his petition on 
November 26, 2007. (R., p. 7.) Mailing his petition more than a year after 
Estrada was decided was not within a "reasonable time." See Charboneau v. 
State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) (successive petitions must be filed 
within reasonable time of learning facts underlying new claims). Whether this 
Court applies the "reasonable time" standard of Charboneau or the one-year 
standard of I.C. § 19-4902(a), Kriebel has failed to show his petition was timely 
even if Estrada were to be given retroactive effect. 
D. The UPCPA Does Not Include A "Retroactivity" Exception To Its One-Year 
Filing Requirement 
A proceeding under the UPCPA "may be filed at any time within one (1) 
year ... from the determination of an appeal .... " I.C. § 19-4902(a). Absent a 
showing by the petitioner that the one-year statute of limitation should be tolled, 
the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal 
of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas 
V. State, 139 Idaho 957,959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Kriebel argues that the issuance of an opinion by the Idaho Supreme 
Court should be given retroactive application and that this justifies dispensing 
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with the UPCPA limitation period. He has cited no Idaho case holding that 
retroactive application of a case is grounds for filing a post-conviction petition 
outside of the one-year limitation period of the UPCPA. (See generally, 
Appellant's brief.) 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. jQ,_ Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). 
The language of J.C. § 19-4902(a) is plain: a petition must be brought 
"within one (1) year ... from the determination of an appeal" of the underlying 
criminal case. The statute contains no provision exempting claims based on 
some new authority or legal rule. Kriebel has cited to no authority holding that he 
is · entitled by constitution or statute to collaterally attack his conviction or 
sentence in Idaho courts beyond the bounds set by the Idaho Legislature. The 
plain language of the statute does not include any "retroactivity" exception for 
collateral attacks on a conviction under the UPCPA, and therefore Kriebel has 
failed to show error in the dismissal of his untimely petition. 
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E. The Holding Of Estrada Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For 
Retroactive Application 
Even if there were a retroactivity exception to I.C. § 19-4902(a), Kriebel 
has failed to show retroactivity would apply in this case. A decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States must be given retroactive effect to cases 
pending on direct review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141 n.1, 176 P.3d 
911, 913 n.1 (2007) (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 
(1993)). But see State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 517, 181 P.3d 440, 443 (2008) 
(case law overruling precedent upon which a defendant relied may not be given 
retroactive effect to defendant's detriment) (citing State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609, 
611, 97 P.3d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 2004)). Decisions of the Supreme Court 
generally need not, however, be given retroactive effect on a collateral challenge 
to a conviction. See, !Uh, Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 P.3d 958, 
960 (2005) (decision requiring jury determination of defendant's eligibility for 
death penalty not given retroactive application to cases not on direct review); 
Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 438, 914 P.2d 933, 935 (1996) (stating, in dicta, 
that new decision of Idaho Supreme Court would not apply retroactively in 
collateral challenge to sentence). Instead, the holding of a case will be given 
retroactive application in collateral challenges to a judgment only if the holding of 
the case represents a "new rule" that '"requires observance of procedures 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' In Re: Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 476, 
903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and 
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Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion)).2 The holding in 
Estrada, however, is neither a "new rule" nor one that is "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." 
1. Estrada Did Not Create A "New Rule" 
The holding in Estrada was not a "new rule." A "new rule" is one not 
dictated by existing precedent and that was susceptible to reasonable debate at 
the time judgment was rendered. Gafford, 127 Idaho at 476 n.1, 903 P.2d at 65 
n.1 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). The holdings of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada were, by the Court's own reasoning, dictated by 
precedent and not susceptible to debate; therefore, the holdings do not constitute 
a "new rule." 
Estrada was convicted of rape and ordered by the district court to undergo 
a psychosexual evaluation. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 560, 149 P.3d 833, 
835 (2006). Estrada initially did not want to participate in the evaluation, but did 
after being advised to do so by his counsel. Id. Estrada claimed in post-
conviction proceedings that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him 
that his privilege against compelled self-incrimination extended to participation in 
2 The adoption of the Teague standard in In re: Gafford (albeit arguably in dicta) 
seems to belie the assertion that Idaho courts should follow a different 
retroactivity standard than the Supreme Court of the United States. Kriebel cites 
no case more recent than 1982 for the proposition that Idaho may employ a 
different standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-16.) More importantly, however, 
Kriebel argued for application of the Teague standard below (R., pp. 40-41 ); 
therefore his claims that a different standard should have been applied by the 
district court (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-16) are not preserved for review. State v. 
Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). See also State v. 
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000) (appellant is 
estopped from asserting invited error on appeal). 
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the psychosexual evaluation. j_g_,_ The district court agreed that counsel's failure 
to so advise Estrada was deficient performance, but held that Estrada had failed 
to establish prejudice. j_g_,_ at 560-61, 149 P.3d at 835-36. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that there was no clear law that a 
defendant could invoke his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse 
participation in a sentencing evaluation, and therefore his counsel's performance 
was not deficient in failing to so advise Estrada. Id. at 561, 149 P.3d at 836. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. In so doing, the 
Court first held that the Sixth Amendment applied to Estrada's claim, but noted its 
holding was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a psychos.exual 
exam." j_g_,_ at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (emphasis added). The Court then 
addressed whether counsel's performance had been deficient, and stated "[t]his 
Court's decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, 
for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination applies." j_g_,_ at 563, 149 P.3d at 838. Finally, 
the court found prejudice. j_g_,_ at 565, 149 P .3d at 840. 
That the Estrada Court itself felt it was applying an "old rule" instead of a 
"new rule" is apparent from the Estrada decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
had specifically held that it was declaring a "new rule" under the Fifth 
Amendment, which was the basis of its holding that Estrada's counsel could not 
be held to have performed deficiently. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, 
however, concluding that the law was sufficiently well established to have 
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required Estrada's trial counsel to have advised him of his right against 
compulsory self-incrimination in relation to the psychosexual evaluation. 
Kriebel argues that Estrada enunciates a "new rule" under the Sixth 
Amendment because it is in conflict with the holding of State v. Curless, 137 
Idaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002). (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) While 
there is some merit to the argument that Curless should have controlled in 
Estrada, ultimately the Estrada Court reasoned that counsel in that case should 
have known of his duty to advise his client of his right to silence. "Under the 
Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a 
new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review." 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007). Estrada 
was seeking collateral review: if the Idaho Supreme Court had concluded it was 
applying a "new rule," then Estrada himself would have been unable to take 
advantage of the "new rule," and the Supreme Court would have affirmed the 
lower courts. The Estrada court itself clearly rejected the concept that it was 
applying a "new rule." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also rejected an argument 
almost identical to that made by Kriebel in this case. In Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 
211 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that precedent of the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307(1985)) did 
not apply retroactively. Aiken, 484 U.S. at 213. The South Carolina Attorney 
General argued this was so because the Francis case was a "new rule" that was 
not otherwise retroactively applicable. lg,_ at 215. The Supreme Court rejected 
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this argument, concluding that in the controlling case (Francis) the Court had 
merely applied the rule announced in a prior case, and had stated in Francis that 
it was so doing. Id. at 215-17. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada at least implicitly concluded it was 
not applying a "new rule." It certainly rejected the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning that Estrada was not entitled to relief because the rule it was applying 
was "new." If the rule in Estrada was in fact new (but failed to otherwise qualify 
for retroactive application) it would not have applied to Estrada himself, or to any 
other defendant whose direct review was completed prior to issuance of the 
Estrada opinion. Kriebel has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the 
Sixth Amendment rule in question was "new." 
2. Even If The Rule Announced In Estrada Were New. It Was Not 
"Watershed" 
Kriebel has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if it 
were "new," meets the legal standards for retroactive application. As stated 
above, even a "new rule" is not retroactively applied unless it "'requires 
observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' In Re: 
Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). A "new rule" does not meet this standard unless it is a "watershed rule 
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 
1181 (2007) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). "This exception 
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is extremely narrow." kt (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court has "observed that it is unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge." 
kt (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). The Court has also, in 
every case since Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), rejected every claim that 
a new rule should be applied retroactively. kt at 1181-82 (see cases cited). The 
"new rule" articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding 
that "testimonial" statements may not be introduced without providing right to 
confront declarant), did not qualify as "watershed." Bockting, 549 U.S. at _, 
127 at 1182-84. 
Kriebel has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if new, 
was "watershed." 
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two 
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an 
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the 
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 
Bockting. 549 U.S. at_, 127 at 1182 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Application of this standard shows that Estrada's rule is not "watershed." 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed application of the 
retroactivity standard to new sentencing rules in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 
348 (2004), where the Court decided that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 
(holding that statutory aggravators that make a defendant eligible for the death 
penalty must be decided by a jury), is not subject to retroactive application. 
The Court first noted the applicable standard for the first part of the two-
part test set forth above, then stated, "That a new procedural rule is 
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'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one without 
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Schriro, 
542 U.S. at 352 (emphasis original, quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Thus, in that case "the question is whether judicial factfinding so seriously 
diminishes accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing 
conduct the law does not reach." l!;L_ at 355-56 (emphasis original, quotation 
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court stated it was "implausible that 
judicial factfinding so seriously diminishes accuracy as to produce an 
impermissibly large risk of injustice." l!;L. at 356 (emphasis original, quotation 
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Thus, the rule announced in the Ring 
decision, requiring jury instead of judicial factfinding, was not "watershed." Id. 
Here Kriebel has not established that sentencing under the rubric of law 
prior to Estrada "seriously diminishes" the accuracy of factfinding in sentencing 
such there was an "impermissibly large risk of injustice." There is no indication 
that a significant number of defendants will choose to exercise their Fifth 
Amendment rights and forgo an evaluation. Those who choose to participate in 
the evaluation are in the same position as all defendants pre-Estrada, and are 
not at greater risk of injustice than those who refuse the evaluation. In addition, 
depriving the sentencing court of an evaluation seems more calculated to making 
factfinding regarding rehabilitation potential less accurate, rather than more 
accurate; indeed, it seems apparent that most defendants who exercise their 
rights and refuse an evaluation out of fear of incrimination will do so with the 
hope that factfinding at sentencing will be less accurate. In short, while trials, 
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sentencings and other court proceedings cannot be counted on to be accurate if 
a defendant is entirely deprived of all rights to counsel, the rule that counsel have 
an obligation to accurately describe to their clients their right to refuse a 
sentencing evaluation is not a rule that seriously enhances the accuracy of 
sentencing. 
Likewise, having counsel's advice on the right to remain silent for a 
psychosexual evaluation does not "alter our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Indeed, having 
that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision whether to 
participate in an evaluation because he believes participation will ultimately help 
at sentencing, or decline to participate because he believes participation will be 
incriminating in the sense that it would lead to a longer sentence. An evaluation 
itself is not constitutionally required; whether a defendant invokes his right to 
silence and participates in the evaluation or instead elects to not participate is 
simply not a bedrock procedural element essential to a fair sentencing. 
Kriebel does not even try to apply this standard in his case. On the 
contrary, he argues that any new rule expanding the right to effective assistance 
of counsel in any way is watershed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) 
The flaw in this argument is that in the cases Kriebel cites the issue was 
denial of counsel, not merely whether the defendant had the effective assistance 
of counsel. See Aresenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (right to 
presence of counsel at plea hearings); McConnell v. Rhay. 393 U.S. 2 (1968) 
(right to presence of counsel at probation revocation proceedings). In Estrada 
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there was no claim that Estrada was denied counsel; his only claim was that his 
counsel had acted ineffectively when he encouraged Estrada to participate in the 
evaluation without informing him that he had a right to not participate. Estrada, 
143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (Estrada's right articulated as right to 
advice, not presence). There is a fundamental difference between the absolute 
denial of counsel and a holding that counsel was constitutionally required to give 
accurate advice on legal rights that might have been asserted in relation to an 
ordered psychological evaluation. 
In Estrada the Idaho Supreme Court applied the holding of Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), in the context of a non-capital case, stating that it 
would "make no sense" to afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel at the 
guilty plea hearing and sentencing but then hold that he was not "entitled to the 
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation." 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Kriebel has failed to show how this ruling is 
"watershed," as that term is defined in the law. 
11. 
Kriebel Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Claim He Was Denied 
Access To The Courts 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that Kriebel had failed to establish grounds for 
equitable tolling such that the petition would be deemed timely. (R., pp. 48-51.) 
Kriebel argues due process demanded equitable tolling of the time to file his 
petition. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-21.) Kriebel's argument fails on both the facts 
and the law. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. kl.:. at 434, 835 P .2d 
at 669. 
C. Kriebel Was Not Entitled To "Equitable Tolling" Of The Time To File His 
Post-Conviction Petition 
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows 
that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time." 
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable 
tolling theories in the context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v. 
State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
"extraordinary circumstances" and acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for 
post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the 
one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 may be tolled if an applicant is 
prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to courts, from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 
957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 
791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate a causal 
connection between the "extraordinary circumstance" and failure to timely file a 
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petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained, in the context of a claim of tolling 
due to mental illness: 
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA 
to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented 
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness 
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to 
bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable 
of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Equitable tolling will 
apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness 
actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any 
period following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet 
the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the limitation period. 
Chico-Rodriquez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 
2005) (emphasis added). 
Kriebel argues on appeal that he should have been afforded equitable 
tolling because he "was housed in an out-of-state facility with no access to Idaho 
legal resources" and because his criminal trial attorney "informed [him] that he 
had no good prospects for filing a post-conviction petition," which advice proved 
wrong once the Estrada opinion was issued some months later. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 21.) These claims are neither factually accurate nor legally sufficient to 
show error by the district court. 
The allegations actually made by Kriebel were that he was in prison in 
Washington for up to four months in late 2005 (shortly after sentencing in the 
criminal case). (R., p. 36.) There was no attempt to show that being 
incarcerated in Washington, on Washington charges, denied Kriebel access to 
the courts in Idaho. Although he claims on appeal that he lacked access to Idaho 
legal resources while in Washington, he did not allege that or present evidence of 
it below. The mere allegation that he was incarcerated in Washington on a 
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Washington charge is not enough to show lack of access to the Idaho courts. 
Kriebel failed to even allege, much less establish by evidence, that his 
incarceration in Washington was the reason he did not file his post-conviction 
petition during September through December 2005, much less, as the district 
court concluded, explain why he did not file before October 16, 2006. 
Likewise, Kriebel alleged that he contacted his criminal trial attorney, in 
early 2006, and filed the letter sent him by counsel. (Augmentation.) That letter 
does not mention post-conviction, whether there would be a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the right to silence in relation to psychosexual sentencing 
evaluations, or any other matter relevant to the current claim. More importantly, 
there is no claim or showing of how counsel's advice "actually prevented," Chico-
Rodriquez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140, Kriebel from filing his post-
conviction petition before October 16, 2006. In short, nothing in the letter rises to 
the level of proving that his trial counsel denied Kriebel access to the Idaho 
Courts. 
To be entitled to equitable tolling, Kriebel must establish that he was 
denied access to Idaho's courts. None of the claims he supported with evidence 
rise to the level of showing such denial of access, much less that the denial of 
access prevented him from filing in a timely fashion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
of summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 2nd day of March 2009. 
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